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Abstract—This paper analyzes the notion of causality in a 
conceptual model, mainly as applied in software engineering. 
Conceptual system modeling can be considered a three-level 
process that begins with building a static structural description to 
develop a dynamic model that will identify events used to specify 
the chronology of events. In this context, the model involves a 
representation of a portion of reality, based on ontology of 
different kinds of things and their basic relations to each other. 
Relations are defined in terms of their participating entities. This 
paper concerns relations between events, specifically causal 
relations among events in modeling. We examine causality in 
many fields of study to understand its role in modeling. The 
problem is that, according to many researchers, causation is so 
inextricably bound up in misleading associations that it is hard to 
define and is shrouded in mystery, controversy, and caution. We 
study and clarify the notion of causality through several 
examples, utilizing an event definition as a time thing/machine in 
a new conceptual modeling methodology. In conclusion, we claim 
that the purpose of causal relations in a system’s static 
description is to constrain the system’s behavior and thus exclude 
some possible chronologies of events. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyzes the notion of causality in a conceptual 
model, mainly as applied in software engineering. The purpose 
of specifying the causality in a system’s static description is to 
constrain the system’s behavior and thus exclude some possible 
chronologies of events. “Specification” here refers to 
descriptive modeling (e.g., in contrast to mathematical) aimed 
at abstractly describing the actual state of affairs in a system as 
a well-founded basis for a cyberphysical system’s design and 
implementation. The model also provides comprehensibility of 
the modeled portion of real-world aspects. Such a development 
involves gradual evolution at different levels of abstraction, 
progressing through static (e.g., classifying objects), dynamic 
(e.g., identifying events), and behavioral (e.g., specifying the 
chronology of events) phases.  
In this context, a model involves a representation of the 
modeled potion of reality, including the existence of different 
kinds of things and their basic relations with each other. 
Relations are defined in terms of their participating entities, and 
according to Guizzardi, Herre, and Wagner [1], “Without 
relations the world would fall into many isolated pieces.” This 
paper concerns relations among events, specifically causal 
relations among events in modeling. 
A. Importance 
The ability to learn about the notion of causality is a 
significant component of human-level intelligence and can 
serve as the foundation of artificial intelligence [2]. All 
sciences seem to involve studying the same things: matter, 
causalities, and time [3]. The concept of causation seems to be 
extremely important, “though, as we shall see, this claim has 
been disputed” [4]. An enormous amount of literature exists on 
causality, especially in artificial intelligence, philosophy, 
economics, statistics, genetics, artificial intelligence, and other 
disciplines. 
B. Problem with Causality 
Russell complained that the word “cause” is “inextricably 
bound up with misleading associations” [4]. According to Pearl 
[5], “Though it is basic to human thought, causality is a notion 
shrouded in mystery, controversy, and caution, because 
scientists and philosophers have had difficulties defining when 
one event truly causes another.” Causality is hard to define, and 
we often only intuitively know about causes and effects [6]. 
C. What Is Causality? 
Plato in Timaeus stated that “everything that becomes or 
changes must do so owing to some cause, for nothing can come 
to be without a cause” [7] (italics added). According to 
Aristotle [7], the response to the question “What is this?” could 
be answered in one of the following ways: “This is marble,” 
“This is what was made by Phydias,” “This is something to be 
put in the temple of Apollo,” and “This is Apollo.” These 
responses answer four different questions, respectively, “What 
is this made of?” “Who is this made by?” “What is this made 
for?” and “What is it that makes this what it is and not 
something else?” These answers and questions correspond to 
Aristotle’s four causes:  
 The material cause (e.g., the marble, which can be seen 
as causing the existence of the statue). 
 The efficient cause (e.g., Phydias, who causes the 
statue to exist). 
 The final cause (e.g., the sake of [worshipping] Apollo 
for which the statue was created. 
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 The formal cause (e.g., the form or structure of the 
statue to cause its existence). 
In this sense, cause is “something without which the thing 
would not be [and] Aristotle argued that the most important and 
decisive cause was the formal cause” [7]. 
Descartes (1596-1650) limited his examination of causation 
to the efficient causes of things [7]. Hobbes (1588-1679) 
defined causes in terms of motion, with causation being a 
relation between the motions of different bodies. The material 
and efficient causes are both part of the entire cause. As 
Hulswit [7] stated, “Nothing would happen if nothing moved, 
and the only things that move are bodies. Moreover, all 
causation occurs by contact—that is, it consists if the motion of 
contiguous bodies” (see sources in [7]). Leibniz (1646–1716) 
declared, “there is nothing without a reason, or no effect 
without a cause… Each monad develops in synchrony with all 
other monads. Just as a good clockmaker constructs a number 
of clocks that keep perfect time, so are efficient causality and 
final causality complementary” (see sources in [7]). David 
Hume (1711-1776) viewed causation as “the only relation that 
allows us to go beyond what is immediately present to the 
senses, to discover either the real existence or the relations of 
objects” (see [4]). According to Newton (1642–1727), two 
classes of events exist: those that happen according to a law 
and those that are the effects of causes. Causation and law like 
behavior are mutually exclusive notions [7]. 
According to Beebee [4], the concept of causation has “at 
least in the last half-century or so pervaded philosophical 
theorizing.” The question of its nature has “dominated the 
extensive literature on the topic of causation in analytic 
philosophy in the last fifty years or so” [4].  
Causation has been explained in terms of counterfactual 
conditionals of the form “If A had not occurred, C would not 
have occurred” [8]. According to Lewis [9], “We think of a 
cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference 
it makes must be a difference from what would have happened 
without it. Had it been absent, its effects would have been 
absent as well.” Lewis’s [9] events are classes of possible 
spatiotemporal regions.  
Another approach to causation not only views causality 
with regard to particular events or happenings but also makes 
general causal claims (e.g., smoking causes cancer). Such 
claims are rarely arrived at by generalizing over specific cases 
of “particular” causation but instead mainly based on statistical 
methods. Probabilistic theories of causation seek to analyze the 
notion of general causation by appealing to statistical fact [4]. 
Other researchers claim that in “E because C,” the most basic 
form of a causal claim, “C” and “E” state facts (see [4] 
referencing [10]). In this paper, we are not concerned with this 
probabilistic type of causation. 
Many definitions of event-based causality currently exist. 
The following is a sample list of some of these definitions. The 
aim is to demonstrate the diversity of this notion. 
 Causation is a relationship that holds between events, 
properties, variables, or states of affairs [3]. 
 A cause or event can be one of the following:  
1. A state that persists and does not change over a period 
of time.  
2. An occurrence that can be subcategorized into an 
event, such as 
- An occurrence with a culmination, or a process. 
- An occurrence that is homogenous and does not 
have a climax or an anticipated result (see Khoo, 
Chan, and Niu [11] referencing Terenziani and 
Torasso [12]). 
 Events and processes can be categorized into those that 
have duration (occur over a period of time) and those 
that are momentary. Thus, an event can be one of the 
following: 
1. A punctual occurrence or achievement.  
2. A punctual or momentary process. 
3. A durative process or activity that continues over 
a period of time (see Khoo, Chan, and Niu [11]). 
 An event is a region of space-time that has certain 
features essentially and some only contingently. “For 
example, in the region I am currently occupying, 
several events are currently occurring, one of which is 
essentially my drinking coffee, another is essentially 
my drinking coffee slowly, and another is essentially 
my drinking coffee out of a mug” (see [4] referencing 
Lewis [9]).  
D. In This Paper 
The next section reviews, with some enhancement of the 
ontological theory of a thinging machine (TM). This involves a 
single entity that has a dual being as a thing and a machine 
(thimac). The term “thinging” relies on Heidegger’s [13] notion 
of “things” [14-23]. Based on thimacs, conceptual system 
modeling can be considered a three-level process that begins 
with building a static description of thimacs to develop a 
dynamic model that may identify events used to specify 
behavior Section 3 applies TM to Aristotle’s four causes. 
Sections 4- 7 apply the TM methodology to different types of 
modeling. 
II. THINGING MACHINE  
The TM ontology is based on a single category called 
thimacs. A thimac crystallizes being into dynamic forms and 
kneads together an “object” (called a thing) and a “process” 
(called a machine)—thus, the name thimac. The thimac notion 
is not new. In physics, subatomic entities must be regarded as 
particles and waves to fully describe and explain observed 
phenomena [24]. According to Sfard [25], abstract notions can 
be conceived in two fundamentally different ways: structurally 
as objects/things (static constructs) and operationally as 
processes. Thus, distinguishing between form and content and 
between process and object is popular, but processes and 
objects must unite in order to understand TM bases modeling. 
A TM adopts this notion of duality in conceptual modeling, 
by generalizing it beyond mathematics and its utilization in 
software engineering modeling. “Structural conception” means 
seeing a notion as an entity with a recognizable internal 
structure. The operational way of thinking emphasizes the 
dynamic process of performing actions. A model describes a 
given domain, independent of technological choices that could 
impact the implementation of a system based on itself. 
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A. The Machine 
The term “machine” refers to a special abstract machine 
called a “thinging machine” (see Fig. 1). A TM is built under 
the postulation that the machine only performs five generic 
processes: creating, processing (changing), releasing, 
transferring, and receiving.  
A thimac has a dual being as a thing and a machine. A thing 
is created, processed, released, transferred, and/or received, 
whereas a machine creates, processes, releases, transfers, 
and/or receives things. We will alternate among the terms 
“thimac”, “thing”, and “machine” according to the term we 
want to stress at each instance. 
The five TM flow operations (also called stages) form the 
foundation for thimacs. Across the five stages, the flow (a solid 
arrow in Fig. 1) of a thing means its “motion” of occupying 
different stages. The TM diagram reflects the succession 
imposed on this “motion” of the thing. The flow across the five 
stages is performed in accordance (agreement) with this 
structure. Even though this succession of TM stages is imposed 
by the thimac’s structure, we can incorporate time by saying 
that the flow is the occupation of different stages at different 
times. Note that this definition was inspired by Russell’s 
definition of motion as occupying different places at different 
times [26]. The thing in a TM has no other places beside the 
five generic stages. When we adopt this theory (used to solve 
Zeno’s paradoxes [26]), the arrows in Fig. 1 have no 
corresponding events (time), as they do not denote transitions. 
The generic flow operations of a TM can be described as 
follows. 
 Arrival: A thing reaches a new machine.  
 Acceptance: A thing is permitted to enter the machine. 
If arriving things are always accepted, then arrival and 
acceptance can be combined into the “receive” stage. 
For simplicity, this paper’s examples assume a receive 
stage. 
 Processing (change): A thing that changes without 
creating a new thing undergoes transformation. The 
terms “worked” (thing) and “work on/out” may express 
the sense of the process here. 
 Release: A thing is marked as ready to be transferred 
outside of the machine. 
 Transference: A thing is transported to somewhere 
outside of the machine. 
 Creation: A new thing is born (appears/stands out) in a 
machine, which creates in the sense that it 
“finds/originates” a thing: it brings a thing into the 
system and then becomes aware of it. Creation can 
designate “bringing into existence” in the system 
because what exists is what is found. Appearance 
indicates existence, but existence may not imply 
appearance. Creation also refers to producing, making, 
forming, and bringing forth. Making implies 
processing something to create something else. 
In addition, the TM model includes memory accessed from 
all stages and, triggering that embraces the notion of 
causation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Thinging Machine Language 
The TM in Fig. 1 can be specified in a two-dimensional 
language (which we call TM language), wherein the arrows 
are represented by dots. For example, the following shows 
different flows in Fig. 1 in this TM language: 
Flow.Create.release.transfer.output 
Flow.Create.process.release.transfer.output 
Flow.Transfer.input.receive.arrive.release.transfer.output 
Flow.Transfer.input.receive.arrive.accept.release.transfer.
output 
Flow.Transfer.input.receive.arrive.accept.process.release.t
ransfer.output 
The dot “.” is used to donate flow or containment. We will use 
“-->” to indicate triggering.  
C. Example 
Consider Fig. 2 of a water thimac, in which a machine 
processes oxygen and hydrogen to create the thing water. The 
creation on the machine side corresponds to manifestation on 
the thing side. Thus, the water themac has two faces: (to create 
—verb, manifestation —noun). Fig. 3 illustrates an analogy 
from the arts of simultaneously constructing a thing from two 
halves.  
Figure 1. A thinging machine. 
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Fig. 3. An image that illustrates the simultaneous emergence of two 
halves. 
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Note that this study is a modeling analysis of a limited domain 
(i.e., an accounting system in an organization) and not a new 
ontological theory in philosophy. Within such a context, 
“manifestation” refers to an appearance in the system that is 
modeled. The machine is the active subject (agent) that 
creates, processes (changes), releases, transfers, and receives, 
while the thing is the inert object (patient) being subjected to 
all those processes. Thus, having been created by a machine 
implies that the thing manifests itself. The machine stands 
under the thing; it is the duality of being that describes the 
kernel of the thing. It is also the cause of the thing’s 
manifestation. 
Creation arises within a thimac, as a machine facilitates 
creation, and that creation manifests a thing. The thimac 
includes in it both a material base and an efficient cause. This 
means that the machine can cause the thing’s creation. In this 
case, causation means processing something to bring 
something else into “existence”, i.e., to appear in the system. In 
the water example, the creation as a machine operation is the 
“existence”/cause of the thing water. Fig. 4 shows water as a 
mac and a thi.  
III. ARISTOTLE’S FOUR CAUSES AND BACKWARD 
CAUSATION 
As demonstrated in the Apollo example, Aristotle’s four 
causes can occur at the same time. Fig. 5 shows a static TM 
representation of the four causes. In response to the question 
“What is this?” we say that this is a marble (1) that flows to 
Phydias (2), who has Apollo’s image/form (3) and processes 
(4) the marble according to that form to create (5) a statue that 
is erected in the temple for worship of Apollo (6). Note that 
Phydias, Apollo, the workshop and the temple “exist in the 
model” (i.e., there is a creation stage), but the creation stage is 
not shown, under the assumption that the surrounding box is 
sufficient to imply this. 
Fig. 5 can be written in TM language as follows: 
Flow.Marble.create.release.transfer.Phydias.transfer.recei
ve.transfer.workshop.  
Flow.Apollo.image.create.release.transfer.Phydias.transfer
.receive.release.transfer.workshop. 
Flow.Workshop.transfer.reveive.process--> 
Apollo.temple.statue.create.process. 
The mapping of these flows to the diagram is obvious. 
  To develop the corresponding dynamic model, we need to 
define the notion of an event. An event in a TM is a thimac 
with a time subthimac. For example, the event The marble is 
transported to Phydia is modeled as shown in Fig. 6. It 
contains three thimacs: the time, the region, and the event 
itself. The region is the subdiagram of Fig. 5 where the event 
occurs. The events may include other subthimacs (e.g., 
intensity). For the sake of simplicity, we will represent events 
by their regions if the events do not conflict. 
Fig. 7 shows a dynamic model in which events are 
identified according to Aristotle’s four causes. 
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Fig. 4. Water as a mac and a thi. 
Fig. 5. The static model of the Apollo statue example. 
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A disturbing observation emerges when we construct the 
system’s behavior in Fig. 8. The final cause seems to be an 
event that occurs after creating the statue. According to Khoo, 
Chan, and Nui [11], the final (or teleological) cause is a special 
type that occurs after the effect—a kind of backward causation. 
For example, when a doctor prescribes a drug to treat a 
disease, this is because of the doctor’s belief that the drug will 
cure the disease. An intended future effect thus causes an event 
in the present. This is related to mental causation since the 
cause stems from thought processes in the doctor’s mind. 
Teleological cause is also seen as occurring in nature and can 
be understood in terms of natural selection. For example, a 
bird’s wings can be said to exist so that the bird may fly. 
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [27], 
backward causation means that the temporal order of cause and 
effect is a mere contingent feature, and cases may exist in 
which the cause casually precedes its effect. 
In our example, the backward causation seems to be the 
result of mixing up the static and behavior models. Let us start 
again at the static model of the Apollo statue example. 
  
 “Worshipping Apollo through the statue” does not 
involve time.  
 When we construct the dynamic model, subdiagrams in 
the model become events, including the subdiagram of 
the model: “worshipping Apollo through the statue”. 
Accordingly, the aim (as one of Aristotle’s causes) of 
worshipping Apollo through the statue is not in the 
dynamic model. 
 However, the event of worshipping Apollo through the 
statue (actual worship) is in the dynamic model. For 
example, if the statue is created at 9:00 AM, the 
worship event happens at 9:10 AM. 
 This implies that the aim is different from the event of 
actually practicing worship of Apollo through the 
statue. The aim is a snapshot of what to do at some 
point in the future. Generating such a snapshot at a 
certain time is an event. 
 The declaration or assertion of the aim of worshiping 
Apollo through the statue occurs, say, one year prior to 
the occurrence of the event.  
 
The static model can now be corrected to represent the two 
events (declaring the aim and actual worshiping), as shown in 
Fig. 9. The two events, which coincide in region (subdiagram), 
are (a) asserting the aim to worship Apollo through the statue 
and (b) actually practicing that worship.  
Fig. 10 shows the dynamic model that contains these two 
events. The same subdiagram is drawn twice because it is 
difficult to draw a diagram over itself. Fig. 11 shows the 
correct chronology of events. Note that the material, sufficient, 
and formal descriptions in the static model can be viewed as 
objectives of the aim (the specific steps that can be taken to 
achieve the aim). 
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Fig. 9. The correct static model of the Apollo statue example. 
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IV. ROBOT PROBLEM  
Consider the robot problem described by Pearl [5]: “How 
should a robot acquire causal information through interaction 
with its environment? How should robot process causal 
information received from its creator-programmer?” For 
example, assume we teach our robot all we know about cause 
and effect in a room. When the robot is given the information 
“If the grass is wet, then it rained” and “If we break this bottle, 
the grass will get wet,” then the computer will conclude “If we 
break this bottle, then it will have rained” (see source in Pearl 
[5]). The reasoning goes as follows: 
1. “If the grass is wet, then it rained.”  
2. “If we break this bottle, the grass will get wet.”  
3. “If we break this bottle, then it rained.” 
According to Pearl [2], “Only a few decades ago scientists 
were unable to write down a mathematical equation for the 
obvious fact that ‘mud does not cause rain.’ Even today, only 
the top echelon of the scientific community can write such an 
equation and formally distinguish ‘mud causes rain’ from ‘rain 
causes mud.’” 
Fig. 12 shows the static TM model of this grass situation. 
The rain falls (1) on the grass (2) to change its condition to be 
wet (3). The bottle breaks (4), causing the water (or any liquid) 
inside to fall and make the grass wet (5). Fig. 13 shows the set 
of events according to “it rained”, “the grass is wet”, and “we 
break this bottle”. 
The problem seems to mix “it rained”, “the grass is wet”, 
and “we break this bottle” as events. It is true that “The grass is 
wet” happens after the other two events. Accordingly, we have 
the acceptable behaviors does not include the two sequence, 
E1→E2→E3 or E2→E1→E3, e.g., the wetting should happens 
immediately after raining or breaking the glass. The acceptable 
behaviors are (See Fig. 14): (E1, E2)→E3, i.e., simultaneous 
rain and breaking, E1→ E3→E2, E1→ E3, E2→ E3→E1 and 
E2→ E3. Accordingly, event E2 (“we break this bottle”) never 
implies the event E1 (“it rained”) because after E2 the event E1 
may or may not happens. 
V. EQUATIONS AND EVENTS 
According to Pearl [5], a circuit diagram shows cause–
effect relations among the signals in a circuit. Switching from 
logical gates to linear equations, Pearl [5] assumed a system of 
linear equations with the following two equations: 
Y = 2X, Z = Y + 1, and 
X = Y/2, Y = Z – 1. 
The issue for Pearl [5] was that these equations were equivalent 
to their circuit diagrams, and according to Pearl, “The top one 
tells us that if we physically manipulate Y it will affect Z, 
while the bottom one shows that manipulating Y will affect X 
and will have no effect on Z.” Pearl [5] then discussed the 
effect of physically manipulating Y—for example, by setting Y 
to 0. His conclusion is that from this pair of equations alone, “it 
is impossible to predict the result of setting Y to 0, because we 
do not know what surgery to perform – there is no such thing 
as “the equation for Y.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examining this issue using the TM model shows that this 
system of equations mixes up the notions of operations and 
events. The equations involve operations such as multiplication 
and addition. Fig. 15 shows the static description of this system 
of equations as follows: 
“Y = 2X” is modeled by the flow of X (circle 1) and 2 
(circle 3), to be multiplied (circle 3) to produce Y (circle 4).  
“Z = Y + 1” is modeled by the flow of Y (circle 5) and 1 
(circle 6), to be added (circle 7) to generate Z (8). 
“X = Y/2” is modeled by the flow of Y (circle 9) and 2 
(circle 10), to be divided (circle 11) to produce X (circle 12). 
“Y = Z – 1” is modeled by the flow of Z (circle 13) and 1 
(circle 14), to be subtracted (circle 15) to produce Y (circle 16).  
As previously stated, the static model contains all things 
and machines in the system at all times. 
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Fig. 16 shows the dynamic model. The events are identified 
and named according to the operation being performed, in large 
black characters. Fig. 17 shows the behavior of the set of 
equations {Y = 2X, Z = Y + 1}. In Fig. 17, X is the starting 
point of the multiplying event to create 2X, then the event of 
finding the value of Y, and so on. This means that Y cannot be 
found without 2X previously being calculated, but X should 
have a value before 2X is calculated, and so on. 
Fig. 18 shows the behavior of the set {X = Y/2, Y = Z – 1). 
Y is first given a value so that Y/2 (circle 11) can be calculated, 
and then X has the value of the calculation in Y/2 (12). These 
events can precede 2X but never follow it by Y (see Fig. 18), 
because Y is an event that has already happened. Accordingly, 
the two sets of events are not equivalent in terms of their 
chronology, just as the events 
sleeping→eating→dressing→work is not “equivalent” to the 
events sleeping→dressing→eating→work. 
The issue here is the chronology of events, not the 
manipulation of variables or equations. This mix-up appears 
when Pearl [5] examines the effects of setting Y to 0. Note that 
the two behaviors in Fig. 17 do not permit Y = 0 as an 
additional equation because the equation starts with X and that 
force puts 2X in Y (Y is not an independent variable). 
According to the behaviors in Fig. 17, the only way to set Y to 
0 is to set X to 0, find 2X, and then put the result into Y. In Fig. 
18, setting Y to 0 makes X = 0. 
Assume that Y = 0 is added to the system (zero flows to Y, 
similarly to the flows of 1 and 2 in the static model). In this 
case, we have a third behavior, shown in Fig. 19. Thus, no 
mysterious surgical process is involved here; it is an issue of 
overlapping events. 
In a TM, we can say that the cause of what happens in 
event Z is the event Y + 1, which in turn is caused by Y, which 
is caused by 2X, which is caused by X. Thus, the cause is the 
chronology of events that led to Z. It is impossible to predict 
the result of setting Y to 0 because no behavior in the system 
permits doing so. We handle this situation by specifying a third 
behavior that starts at Y. The chronology of events is an 
important notion in programming. Thus (x + y) – z specifies 
the event (x + y) before the event (resultant sum + z). 
Y+1 Y= 2X Z= 
Y/2 X= Z-1 
Fig. 19. The behavior that include Y=0. 
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VI.  SEMANTICS OF TRIGGERING 
Because we now have a better understanding of the 
semantics of causation, this section addresses how a TM 
diagram incorporates the notion of causality. This leads us to 
conclude that causality in static models is an initial constraint 
on the chronology of events in system behavior. 
The flow in a TM (the solid arrows in the diagrams) forces 
a chronology of events. If there is an arrow from a stage A to a 
stage B in the static description, then event B happens after 
event A. This interpretation can be generalized to non-basic 
events: if there is flow between events, then their sequence in 
the behavior model is decided. For example, if there is a flow 
from Y to Y+1 in Fig. 16, then event Y precedes event Y+1. If 
there are two independent (with respect to flow) subdiagrams, 
then we can ask, what is the acceptable sequence of their 
events? It is possible to specify (a) a certain sequence of events 
or (b) let the events loose as different starts for acceptable 
behavior. These and other cases justify introducing triggers into 
the TM diagram. Triggering specifies logical sequencing at the 
static level. For example, the creation of water results from the 
processing of oxygen and hydrogen (Fig. 2). If we do not 
include a dashed arrow, then the event of creation may occur 
regardless of the occurrence of the oxygen and hydrogen being 
processed. 
One of the mechanisms facilitated by triggering is 
causation. For example, Pearl [5] wrote, “What difference 
would it make if I told you that the rooster does cause the sun 
to rise? The obvious answer is that knowing what causes what 
makes a significant difference in how people act.” From a TM 
perspective, knowing causation is a way to exclude certain 
behaviors. There is no flow from the rooster to the sun; that is, 
the sound does not flow to the sun. If we draw the behavior of 
the {rooster, sun} system, then we have two events: 
E1: The event of the sun rising 
E2: The event of the rooster crowing 
Assuming that E2→E1, this is the result of the static model: 
Rooster.sound.create.release.transfer.sun.transfer.receive.proc
ess-->Rising.create. 
In this case, a person who says that the rooster causes the 
sun to rise must show that the rooster’s sound travels at about 
150 million km. Because this is scientifically false, the speaker 
model has to be as follows: 
Rooster.sound.create-->Sun.rising.create. 
The speaker has to use the dashed arrow “-->” (indicating 
triggering) in the model because the thing sound is 
ontologically different from the thing rising (noun). The issue 
here is dissimilarity in models; Hume (1711-1776) asked how 
we might know that a flame has caused heat, arguing that the 
causality of the events rested on an untestable metaphysical 
assumption. In TM language, 
Flame.create-->Flame.heat.create. 
It is not the case that 
Flame.create-->Heat.create. 
Heat, in this sense, is just a property of the flame. 
In the context of modeling, using a dashed arrow in a TM is 
justified by the agreement of all participants in the system: the 
users, designers, implementers, and so on. 
 
VII. MODELING AN ELEVATOR 
This section provides an example of a model that contains a 
great deal of triggering. 
Hoss [28] modeled an elevator system in a case study, using 
16 textual use cases, use case diagrams, sequence diagrams, 
class diagrams, and state machine diagrams. Figs. 20 and 21 
show a sample use case and a sequence diagram, respectively. 
The static and dynamic TM models of an elevator system 
are shown in Figs. 22 and 23, respectively, assuming one 
elevator. The static model can be described as follows: 
A. Static Model 
The passenger presses (circle 1) a button (2) to trigger (3) 
the creation of a signal requesting the elevator (4). The arrival 
of the signal (6) triggers information being sent to the 
controller about the passenger floor from where the signal 
originated. The signal flows (7) to the controller (8), where it is 
processed (9) to generate a light signal (10), which flows to the 
system on the passenger floor (11) and then to the button (12), 
turning the button light on (13).  
The passenger floor (14) and the floor where the elevator is 
located are compared (16), and the result depends on this 
comparison. 
A.1 Elevator on the Passenger’s Floor 
If the elevator is currently on the passenger floor (17), then 
a signal is created (18) and sent (19) to the door on the 
passenger floor to open it (20). Simultaneously,  
- A signal is created (21) to turn the button light off (22). 
- The time of the system clock (23) is registered to count a 
certain period of time before closing the door (24). 
Use Case Name: Request Elevator 
Primary Actor(s): Passenger;  
Elevator Controller Precondition: Passenger is at a floor and wants to 
ride an elevator car;  
Postcondition: Elevator car is stopped at the passenger’s floor, and the 
elevator doors are opened;  
Scenario:  
Passenger presses an elevator call-up button or -down button 
Elevator controller turns on the call button light  
Elevator controller requests elevator movement 
Elevator controller turns off the elevator call button light  … 
… 
Fig. 20. Sample use case for the elevator system (redrawn, partial from 
[28]). 
:Passenger :Floor :Controller :Timer :Door 
controller 
 
PressButton 
(BT, F) 
ButtonPresse
d  TurnLightOn 
(BT, F) 
UpdateDest 
(BT, F) 
CheckDoors ref) 
.,.. 
Fig. 21. Passenger request sequence diagram (redrawn, partial from [28]). 
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Fig. 22. The static model of the elevator system. 
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Fig. 23. The dynamic model of the system of equations. 
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Upon the wait time elapsing, a signal is created (25) and 
sent (26) to the door to close it (27). 
In the period between the door’s opening and closing, the 
customer enters (28) the elevator (29 and 30) and then selects 
the destination floor (31), which flows to the controller (32) to 
be processed (33). 
A.2 Elevator on a Different Floor Than the Passenger Floor  
If the elevator is located on a different floor (34), a signal is 
created (35) to trigger (36) the elevator’s movement (37) to the 
passenger’s floor (38). 
The elevator’s arrival to the passenger’s floor (38) triggers 
the creation of a notice of this arrival (39).  
The notice is processed (40) to trigger (41) the steps in A. 
Elevator on the Passenger’s Floor. 
The notice is processed (40) to trigger (42) the creation of a 
signal (including the destination floor), which flows to the 
elevator (43). 
The processing (44) triggers (45) the elevator’s movement 
from the passenger’s floor to the destination floor (46 and 47). 
The door opens, and the passenger leaves the elevator (48). 
The location of the elevator is updated (40 and 50). 
B. Dynamic Model 
In the dynamic model, shown in Fig. 23, we observe the 
following: 
 The sequence E1→E2 is defined by triggering in the 
static model because a direct flow is impossible 
between the physical pressing and the signaling of the 
need for the elevator. The modeler adds triggering to 
indicate that a causality relation exists between 
pressing a button and generating a signal. Otherwise, 
the system would permit pressing without a signal 
and/or signaling without pressing. 
 E2 is made of basic events, whose sequence is defined 
by the flow of the requesting signal. 
 The modeler creates E2→E3 to make E2 cause E3. Such 
a triggering process starts another flow of a different 
thing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The triggering mechanism is like a domino effect, 
propagating the event of a piece falling onto another event 
piece in a dynamic cascade. The player has to set the right 
distance between two pieces to ensure that the second event 
will follow the first; otherwise, the first piece may or may not 
hit the second piece. Similarly, in the static model, triggering 
guarantees that E3 happens after E2. 
 The event sequence E3→E5 is defined by the flow of 
the passenger floor (number) to event E5, to be 
compared to the elevator flow. This is not a subjective 
sequence of events. The modeler has to bring the two 
flows together to compare them, which is performed 
after the data arrive. 
 E3→E5 does not involve any relation between the two 
events. Opening the elevator door may or may not be 
followed by the customer entering the elevator. Yet, if 
he/she enters the elevator, the door surely will be open. 
There is no triggering in this case, and the modeler 
decides the sequence of events. 
We can continue examining every relation between events 
to construct Fig. 24, which shows the elevator system’s 
behavior. Accordingly, we can identify the different relations 
between the two events in Fig. 24 to decide whether the 
behavior is based on flow (black arrows) or something else (red 
arrows), as shown in Fig. 25.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have reviewed the notion of causality to 
explain its role in modeling. Our analysis leads us to conclude 
that casual relations are identified by the modeler (subjective), 
in contrast to flow relations, which comprise their own 
sequences of happenings.  
The modeler is analogous to a weaver who interlaces the 
flow and basic five stages of a TM, creating a form out of the 
fabric. He/she is also like a tailor who sews various fabrics 
together (triggering) to produce different forms (behavior).  
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